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Abstract 
We review recent research in robotics, neuroscience, evolutionary neurobiology, and 
ethology with the aim of highlighting some points of agreement and convergence. 
Specifically, we compare Brooks’ (1986) subsumption architecture for robot control with 
research in neuroscience demonstrating layered control systems in vertebrate brains, and with 
research in ethology that emphasizes the decomposition of control into multiple, intertwined 
behavior systems. From this perspective we then describe interesting parallels between the 
subsumption architecture and the natural layered behavior system that determines defense 
reactions in the rat. We then consider the action selection problem for robots and vertebrates 
and argue that, in addition to subsumption-like conflict resolution mechanisms, the vertebrate 
nervous system employs specialized selection mechanisms located in a group of central brain 
structures termed the basal ganglia. We suggest that similar specialized switching 
mechanisms might be employed in layered robot control architectures to provide effective and 
flexible action selection. 
keywords: subsumption architecture, brain evolution, behavior systems, defense system,  
action selection, basal ganglia. 
citation: Prescott, T.J., Redgrave, P., & Gurney, K. (1999).  Layered control architectures 
in robots and vertebrates, Adaptive Behavior, 7, 99-127. 
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Layered Control Architectures in Robots and Vertebrates  
The field of adaptive behavior seeks a convergence of ideas from the different disciplines 
that study artificial and natural autonomous systems. Demonstrating convergence allows the 
interchange of concepts and ideas and enriches our understanding of both the biological and 
the synthetic (Arbib, 1989; Meyer & Guillot, 1990). Within this tradition the present article 
reviews research in robotics, neuroscience, evolutionary neurobiology, and ethology, with the 
aim of highlighting some key areas of agreement, and argues that this cross-disciplinary 
perspective could help to resolve some of the current dilemmas facing research in 
autonomous robotics. 
Rodney Brooks’ (1986, 1989, 1990, 1991ab, 1995) work in engineering robot “creatures” 
needs little introduction to researchers in adaptive behavior. In the mid-eighties Brooks 
introduced a new methodology—based on an analogy with natural evolution—for building 
“self-sustaining” mobile robots that operate in real-time and in un-customized human 
environments. This research has had enormous influence in robotics and, together with other 
contemporary work that proposed a move towards more distributed and situated systems (e.g. 
Braitenberg, 1986; Minsky, 1986), has inspired a new research paradigm in artificial 
intelligence (see e.g. Meyer & Guillot, 1990; Maes, 1992). A key contribution of Brooks’ 
work is his proposal for a layered, distributed control architecture for mobile robots, termed 
the subsumption architecture (SA). Section 1 of this article briefly outlines the key features of 
the SA. 
A substantial body of the neuroscience literature can be interpreted as demonstrating 
layered control systems in the vertebrate brain. In many ways the notion of layering is a 
common, often unspoken, assumption in contemporary neuroscience, however, the 
implications of the layered nature of the brain are not always acknowledged in a field 
dominated by the study of the mammalian cortex. Section 2 considers work that follows in the 
tradition of John Hughlings Jackson (1884/1958), a neuropsychologist who is particularly 
associated with the notion of layered competence, while Section 3 looks for similarities 
between the robot design process proposed by Brooks and the evolutionary history of the 
vertebrate brain. 
An understanding of adaptive behavior is central to the behavior systems approach which 
stems from  pioneering work in ethology by Lorenz, Tinbergen, and Baerends (see Baerends, 
1976), and has been influential in some recent research in psychology and neuroscience (see 
Timberlake, 1993). A key principle is that the functional organization of the vertebrate brain 
can be decomposed into multiple, semi-independent, systems dedicated to major biological 
functions such as feeding, reproduction, defense, and body care. Section 4 gives a brief 
outline of the behavior systems approach relating it to Brooks' proposal for behavior-based 
robot control. 
A general thesis is best served by a specific example. In Section 5 we argue that the layered 
neural architecture that implements the defense behavior system in the rat bears many 
interesting resemblances to Brooks' SA. A number of specific correspondences are outlined in 
detail. 
Finally, in Section 6, we consider the action selection problem for both natural and 
artificial control systems, distinguishing between emergent and specialized action selection, 
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and between distributed and centralized selection mechanisms. We then note that the basal 
ganglia (BG), a group of functionally-related, central brain structures, have a controlling 
influence on neural systems at multiple levels of the vertebrate nervous system and so form 
an important exception to the overall vertical decomposition of the brain. The BG, we 
propose, act as a specialized action selection device that provides flexible conflict resolution 
between functional units that are widely distributed in the brain. Although providing a 
centralized selection system within the global brain architecture, the BG exploits the 
advantages of distributed switching at a local level.  Understanding the function of the BG 
within the vertebrate brain, we suggest, could help in the design of effective action selection 
mechanisms for robots, supplementing the use of layered, subsumption-style control.  
1 BROOKS’ SUBSUMPTION ARCHITECTURE 
Brooks (1986) introduced the subsumption architecture (SA) as the central element of his 
proposal for building “complete creatures” capable of sustained activity in everyday human 
environments. With only limited modification (Brooks, 1989) the principles of the SA have 
since been employed in the design and control of a large number of mobile robots (see 
Brooks, 1990, 1991b) and have been widely copied. The key aspects of the SA, of most 
relevance here, are as follows: 
Distributed, layered control.  Control in a Brooks’ robot is distributed across several 
layers each composed of multiple modules often mounted on different processors. Layers 
operate in parallel and asynchronously. Within a layer there is no central control module. 
Behavioral decomposition.  The different layers of the control system are designed to 
support different “task-achieving” behaviors (such as obstacle avoidance, wandering, 
exploring, map-building); the problem of controlling the robot is thus decomposed into 
behavioral units rather than into different “functional”1 units (such as perception, modeling, 
planning, and motor control). Within a layer there may be a more traditional decomposition; 
for instance, into sensor and actuator components. However, different layers will use different 
decompositions based on specialized sub-sets of the available sensorimotor apparatus. 
Increasing “levels of competence.”  Each ascending level of the control system adds to 
the behavioral capabilities of the robot resulting in a higher level of overall competence. 
Damage or failure at a higher level reduces the robot to functioning at the level of the next 
highest layer.  The higher layers of the SA often operate by modulating the activity of lower 
layers—hence their contact with the motor resources can be relatively indirect. Since higher 
level modules can implicitly rely on the operation of lower-level behavioral primitives, they 
can be designed to generate more complex or subtle motor acts. 
Incremental construction.  A key constraint on the design process is that, as each 
additional level of competence is incorporated, the total system should be “a strict 
augmentation of the previous one” (Brooks, 1989 p. 253). Designing the control system is 
therefore an incremental process in which each intermediate architecture is extensively tested 
and debugged before the next layer is added. 
Conflict resolution and communication between levels by subsumption mechanisms.  
Higher layers of the control system can subsume the roles of lower ones by suppressing their 
                                                      
1Brooks' distinction between functional and behavioral components is not in common use in 
biology. Here the term function will generally be used to indicate the purpose or use of a 
mechanism as opposed to its form or structure. Where the distinction that Brooks has 
proposed is to be considered this will be made clear in the text. 
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outputs and (optionally) substituting their own. Each lower level continues to  function as 
higher levels are added, “unaware” that those above may be interfering with its data paths. 
Little sensor fusion and no central models.  Brooks’ (1986) places less emphasis on the 
combination of multiple sensor signals to determine the most accurate estimate possible of 
world state (sensor fusion) than on the independent use of different sources of sense data to 
provide robustness to changing environmental conditions, sensor noise, or hardware failure 
(see also Prescott, 1996). One consequence of this view is the principle that the robot should 
have no need for central world models into which all available sense data is compiled. Rather 
than exploiting shared representations, behaviors at different levels are separated by 
“abstraction barriers” (Brooks, 1990), unable to influence each other’s internal workings by 
anything more than simple subsumption mechanisms. Internal state at each higher level 
cannot be accessed by lower layers, although higher layers can access the data paths of those 
below. 
The Subsumption Metaphor in Biology 
Though the main impact of Brooks’ work has clearly been in robotics and AI, it has also 
had a significant influence on the study of natural intelligence. Work in this wide area that 
acknowledges the influence of Brooks’ approach includes studies of human perception and 
motor control (Ballard, Hayhoe, & Whitehead, 1992; King, Dykeman, Redgrave et al., 1992), 
human development (Rutkowska, 1994), and research in computational neuroethology (e.g. 
Altman & Kien, 1989; Arbib & Liaw, 1995; Cliff, 1991; Franceschini, 1992).  
Brooks himself does not make strong claims for the SA as a model for understanding 
natural autonomous systems. Indeed, he explicitly states that, although the SA draws on an 
evolutionary metaphor, it is not a biological model. He also warns of the dangers of treating 
biological intelligence as a lodestar for AI (Brooks, 1995). However, Brooks also insists that 
his interest is in general intelligence (Brooks, 1995), that he sees animal intelligence as an 
important “existence proof of the possibility of intelligent entities” (Brooks, 1990, p. 5), and 
that we should expect to gain insights for robot design by studying the nervous systems and 
behavior of animals (Brooks, 1991a; Brooks, 1995). The search for further links between 
Brooks’ robot architectures and our understanding of animal intelligence therefore fits 
naturally with the situated robotics approach.  
The SA is not unique, of course, in being a layered robot control architecture. For 
example, Arbib and Liaw (1995), Roitblat (1991), McGonigle (1990), and Albus (1991), have 
each proposed architectures for robot control inspired by biological intelligence and sharing a 
number of interesting similarities with the architecture of the vertebrate brain. Several 
architectures have also been proposed that are principally refinements or extensions of the SA 
(e.g. Rosenblatt & Payton, 1989; Connell, 1990). This article focuses on the original SA, 
however, as it is probably the best known and most imitated architecture in behavior-based 
robotics. Drawing comparisons with such a widely understood model will, we hope, 
encourage robot designers to look with greater interest at the organization of the vertebrate 
nervous system as a source of inspiration for the design of robot control architectures. 
2 THE VERTEBRATE BRAIN VIEWED AS A LAYERED 
ARCHITECTURE 
The Jacksonian Perspective in Neuroscience 
In 1884, in a famous lecture on the “evolution and dissolution of the nervous system” the 
neurologist John Hughlings Jackson (1884/1958) proposed a layered view of the nervous 
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system, in which the brain is seen as implementing multiple levels of sensorimotor 
competence. Jackson’s view, inspired by the Darwinian revolution in nineteenth century 
science,2 was based not on the usual morphological divisions but on functional grounds, “as 
to the degree of indirectness with which each [division] represents the body, or part of it” (p. 
53). He divided the nervous system into lower, middle, and higher centers, and proposed that 
this sequence represented a progression from the “most organized” (most fixed) to the “least 
organized” (most modifiable), from the “most automatic” to the “least automatic,” and from 
the most “perfectly reflex” to the least “perfectly reflex.”  This progression sees an increase in 
competence in a manner that we might now understand as a behavioral decomposition—
higher centers are concerned with same sort of sensorimotor coordinations as those below, 
though in a more indirect fashion: 
 That the middle motor centers represent over again what all the lowest motor 
centers have represented, will be disputed by few. I go further, and say that the 
highest motor centers (frontal lobes) represent over again, in more complex 
combinations, what the middle motor centers represent. In recapitulation, there is 
increasing complexity, or greater intricacy of representation, so that ultimately the 
highest motor centers represent, or, in other words, coordinate, movements of all 
parts of the body in the most special and complex combinations.  (Jackson 
1884/1958 p. 53) 
Jackson viewed the evolution of the nervous system as an incremental process in which 
lower levels are retained intact but are suppressed by higher systems. Within the different 
centers Jackson further considered there to be functionally distinct layers. He argued for a 
dissociation of higher layers from those below such that a breakdown at a higher layer—a 
“dissolution” in Jackson’s terminology—caused a reversion to the next highest layer of 
control. 
There are further important parallels between Jackson’s writing and contemporary 
approaches in robotics. For instance, he was an early of advocate of the notion of distributed 
representation. Overall, his writings show a conviction that “higher” thought is grounded in 
perception and action—a perspective which, while radical for his era,3 is clearly in sympathy 
with recent proponents of situated action (e.g. Brooks, 1990, 1995; Chapman, 1991): 
A man physically regarded is a sensorimotor mechanism. I particularly wish to 
insist that the highest centers—physical basis of mind or consciousness—have this 
kind of constitution, that they represent innumerable different impressions and 
movements of all parts of the body [..] It may be rejoined that the highest centers 
are “for mind.” I assert that they are “for body,” too. If the doctrine of evolution be 
true, all nervous centers must be of sensorimotor constitution.  (Jackson, 
1884/1958, p. 63) 
Jackson’s views on the functional organization of the nervous system continue to 
influence and inspire neuroscientific research (see e.g. Teitelbaum, Schallert & Whishaw, 
1983; Rudy, Stadler-Morris & Albert, 1987; King et al., 1992; Berntson, Boysen & Cacioppo, 
1993), and there is now a mass of empirical evidence—anatomical, physiological and 
                                                      
2A number of Hughlings Jackson's contemporaries held similar views on brain organization, 
for review see Magoun (1958),  Berntson, Boysen and Cacioppo (1993). 
3The prevailing view was that the brainstem and spinal cord controlled motor functions whilst 
the cerebral cortex was reserved for higher cognitive functions (Jackson, 1884/1958; 
Humphrey, 1986). 
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behavioral—that supports the notion of layered control systems in the vertebrate brain. Some 
of the experimental support for this view is briefly summarized below. 
Dissociations 
The Jacksonian view predicts a dissociation between higher and lower level components 
of a system where the lower level competence is left intact by damage at a higher level. 
Discoveries of such dissociations were amongst the earliest findings of neuroscience and are 
now understood to abound in the vertebrate nervous system (for reviews see Gallistel, 1980; 
Wishaw, 1990). For instance, it has been demonstrated that removing the cerebral cortex from 
a cat or a rat—thereby eliminating many major sensory, motor and cognitive centers—leaves 
intact the ability to generate motivated behavior. The animal still searches for food, eats to 
maintain body weight, shivers when cold, fights or escapes when attacked, and so on. These 
behaviors appear awkward and clumsy when compared to controls and are often poorly 
adjusted to circumstances. However, the ability to generate appropriate, motivated action 
sequences is retained. When most of the forebrain is removed, complete behaviors can no 
longer be produced, but the capacity for individual actions such as standing, walking, 
grooming, and eating is spared. With all but the hindbrain and spinal cord removed, the 
animal cannot coordinate the movements required for these actions—for instance, it cannot 
stand or walk unaided—however, most of the component movements that make up the 
actions are still possible. Similar results have been observed in several classes of vertebrates 
(see, for instance, Overmier & Hollis, 1990, for a discussion of related findings in fish) 
leading to the widely accepted conclusion that the anatomically lower levels of the vertebrate 
nervous system organize simpler movements, while higher levels impose more complex 
forms of behavioral control. 
Jacksonian Progressions 
 A further implication of a Jacksonian view is that during ontogeny (development) the 
brain matures through the sequential addition of higher centers (Teitelbaum et al., 1983; Rudy 
et al,. 1987). This form of development has been observed post-natally in the maturation of 
rats and rhesus monkeys (see Rudy et al, 1987 for review). For instance, in rats, reflexive 
responses to stimuli (visual, auditory, or gustatory) have been shown to mature several days 
before the same stimuli are able to mediate learned behavioral reactions. Unlearned reflexive 
responses can be generated by the brainstem components of sensory systems, whereas learned 
behaviors of this kind generally require higher-level components. Evidence for a comparable 
developmental sequence can be found in the rat’s ability to negotiate the Morris water maze 
task (Rudy et al., 1987). Specifically, infant rats can learn to approach a visible goal before 
they are able to use distal visual cues to locate and approach an invisible goal, the former 
ability can be mediated by low-level, associative learning mechanisms, while the latter ability 
requires the operation of at least one higher level structure (the hippocampus). 
It is important to note that the hypothesis that the brain is a layered architecture is not 
identical to the conjecture that brain evolution has followed an incremental path, even though 
many, including Jackson, have seen it in that light. The architecture of the brain may be 
layered simply because this provides an efficient and robust design. Likewise, a 
developmental progression is unlikely to be a strict recapitulation of the phylogenetic origins 
of the brain (Deacon, 1990; Butler & Hodos, 1996) but will be the consequence of a 
combination of constraints on the ontogenetic process, including, perhaps, the need for brain 
systems to “boot-up” in an appropriate order. We will consider the evidence for incremental 
change in the nervous system separately when we address the topic of brain evolution in 
Section 3. 
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Hierarchies,  Heterarchies,  or Layers 
Hughlings Jackson, like many others since, suggested that the layered architecture of the 
brain provides a hierarchical organization of neural function. The many advantages of 
hierarchical decomposition of control have been summarized by Szentágothai and Arbib 
(1975) (see also Arbib, 1989). Gallistel (1980), reviewing some of the classical neuroscience 
literature, concludes that the nervous system can be viewed as a "lattice hierarchy" in which 
lower-level units are recruited by multiple different, and potentially competing, higher level 
masters. According to this view, the activation of lower level systems occurs through a 
combination of activating inputs at the same level (some of which may be of sensory origin) 
and potentiating signals from higher levels that can allow or disallow the units' response.  
Roitblat (1991) has suggested that Gallistel’s lattice design could make an effective robot 
control architecture. 
Opposition to the view of the brain as a hierarchical control system has focused on the 
nature and extent of feedback loops between lower and higher level neural systems. The 
existence of such loops has been interpreted as evidence for heterarchical rather than 
hierarchical control (see e.g. Kien, 1986; Cohen, 1992). Szentágothai and Arbib (1975), who 
are otherwise favorably disposed toward hierarchical schemes, note that such loops certainly 
make it more difficult to decide exactly "who is commanding whom" in the system. We 
conclude that a purely hierarchical arrangement does not accurately describe the vertebrate 
nervous system, which may be best viewed as a sophisticated trade-off exploiting useful 
characteristics of both hierarchical and heterarchical schemes. In this article we therefore use 
the more neutral term “layered”, which, following Jackson and Brooks, we understand to 
mean the decomposition of a control system into multiple levels of competences with lower 
levels dissociable from those above.  
Our definition of a layered control system specifically allows for feedback loops that 
support two-way interactions between different levels.  It is interesting to ask whether there is 
anything equivalent to this in Brooks' SA in which the emphasis, as in many models of brain 
architecture, is on one-way links from higher to lower levels. First, we note that the SA 
allows modules in each higher layer to inspect the data paths of modules in the layer below.  
This mechanism could allow the higher level system to respond to changes it has itself 
initiated in the lower level system. Second, an important source of between level feedback in 
Brooks' architecture arises from the notion of interaction through the world. Modules, that are 
unconnected within the control system, may yet influence each other through the effects of 
their actions on the state of the agent or the environment. This possibility, which is often 
overlooked when the nervous system is viewed as a control hierarchy, provides an alternative 
means of completing feedback loops between higher and lower level systems. 
Further Dimensions of Nervous System Organization 
The nervous system is an intricately complex three-dimensional structure. Although we 
have emphasized the layered nature of the brain we recognize that there will be other 
important governing principles in brain organization.  
Following the embryologist Karl Ernst von Baer a number of neuroscientists have 
recognized a concentric dimension to brain organization (see Magoun, 1958; Berntson et al., 
1993). Von Baer noted that brain development proceeds from the center outwards, and that as 
neurons migrate to lateral and peripheral positions they become differentiated and specialized. 
This suggests an organizing principle according to which more generalized systems are 
placed centrally and more specialized ones at the periphery.  
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While a concentric dimension can be seen as complimentary to a vertical (layered) 
organization, the neurologist Wilder Penfield (1958) proposed an organizing principle that is 
less easily accommodated within a Jacksonian view. Penfield suggested that a group of 
central, sub-cortical brain structures serves to coordinate and integrate the activity of both 
higher- (cortical) and lower-level neural systems. This notion is captured in the proposal of a 
centrencephalic dimension to nervous system organization (see also Berntson et al., 1993; 
Thompson 1993). Penfield’s theory has been further developed by Thompson (1993), who 
identifies the centrencephalic “core” with brain nuclei belonging to, or associated with, the 
basal ganglia. In Section 6 we will suggest that many of these structures can be 
accommodated with the view of the brain as a layered architecture by assigning them a key 
role in action selection. 
3 THE EVOLUTION OF THE VERTEBRATE BRAIN 
The above discussion suggests that a major organizing principle in the vertebrate brain is 
a vertical decomposition into layered sub-systems. We suggest that this layered architecture 
has interesting parallels with Brooks' subsumption architecture for robot control. A more 
detailed exposition of this position for the specific case of the rat defense system will be 
presented in Section 5.  
In addition to suggesting how a robot control system might be organized, Brooks' SA 
contains a proposal for the design process for such systems. A key idea of the SA—which 
draws on an analogy with natural evolution—is that a complex control system can be 
constructed by progressively incrementing an initially simple system with extensive testing 
and debugging of each intermediate architecture. Although Brooks does not claim that this 
incremental layering process is anything other than “a simplistic and crude analogy for 
evolutionary development” (Brooks, 1991a p. 1229), it is worthwhile considering whether 
there are similarities between this design process and the evolutionary path that has led to 
layered control systems in the vertebrate brain. In this section we therefore briefly outline 
some key findings and considerations concerning the evolution of the vertebrate nervous 
system focusing first on major morphological changes, and second on finer-grained changes 
in brain circuitry. 
Major Evolutionary Changes in the Morphology of the Vertebrate Nervous System 
Comparative and paleo-neurobiological studies reveal that a basic plan for the nervous 
system was established at a surprisingly early stage in vertebrate evolution (Jerison, 1973; 
Hodos, 1982; Miklos, 1993; Butler & Hodos, 1996). Specifically, the gross morphological 
divisions of the brain—spinal cord, hindbrain, midbrain, diencephalon, telencephalon—are 
present in all vertebrate classes and are also found in the earliest fossilized endocasts of 
jawless fish. This makes the general plan of the vertebrate brain at least four hundred million 
years old—indeed, it may have been in place as little as fifty million years after the Cambrian 
explosion which marked the first appearance of most of the modern metazoan phyla (Miklos, 
1993).  Many brain sub-divisions, including most of the components that make up the 
forebrain telencephalon, are also shared across the vertebrate classes and are therefore likely 
to have been present in early ancestors (Northcutt, 1981; Belekhova & Veselkin, 1985; Butler 
& Hodos, 1996). Figure 1 illustrates the major morphological divisions of the generalized 
vertebrate brain. All of the brain sub-divisions shown in the figure are found in all classes of 
vertebrates, with the exception of the cerebellum, which may be absent in jawless fish 
(Northcutt, 1996), and the amygdala, septum, and striatum, whose presence in jawless fish is 
suspected but not confirmed (Belekhova, 1990; Northcutt, 1994; Butler & Hodos, 1996). The 
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forebrain pallium has three major sub-divisions in all vertebrates.  In mammals, where the 
pallium is termed the cerebral cortex, most of the dorsal pallium forms the neocortex, while 
the medial pallium forms a group of structures that includes the hippocampus, and the lateral 
pallium forms the olfactory cortex. The extent to which each of these areas in mammals is 
homologous4 with like-named pallial areas in non-mammals is, however, only partially 
resolved. There is insufficient space here for specific consideration of the various brain sub-
divisions named in the figure, the reader is referred to Walker (1983), Arbib (1989), and 
Butler and Hodos (1996) for general introductions to brain function and evolution. A number 
of the brain regions shown are also discussed in later sections. 
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Figure 1.  Diagrammatic representation of a generalized vertebrate brain showing the 
major morphological components (based on Nauta & Karten, 1970; Walker, 1983; Butler & 
Hodos, 1996). 
 
 Variations from the basic nervous system plan, in the different vertebrate classes, show 
specialization to different adaptive zones (ways of living) that in some cases have resulted in 
increased size and complexity of certain brain regions (Jerison, 1973; Harvey & Krebs, 1990). 
A well-known example is the massive expansion of the cerebral cortex and cerebellum in 
mammals5 compared to ancestral synapsid reptiles, and the further expansion of these regions 
                                                      
4 Homologous structures are those which have originated from the same structure in a 
common ancestor, since homology is defined by inheritance there may be derived differences 
in form and function. 
5Less well-known, but of perhaps similar importance, is the expansion of various brain 
regions in vertebrate groups belonging to other classes. For instance, the telencephalon of 
birds is dramatically expanded compared to other non-mammalian tetrapods, as is that of 
some groups of sharks and rays relative to other cartilaginous fish, and, within the jawless 
fish, of hagfish relative to lampreys. These observations demonstrate the inadequacy of any 
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in some mammalian classes. Such changes do not, however, necessarily indicate the genesis 
of entirely new brain areas. For instance, the mammalian neocortex, perhaps the most derived 
structure in the mammalian forebrain, is likely to have evolved from areas in the dorsal 
pallium of earlier jawed vertebrates with similar incoming and outgoing connections 
(Northcutt, 1981; Northcutt & Kaas, 1995). Findings such as these have led researchers to 
conclude that vertebrate brain evolution has been a more conservative process than was 
previously thought. Expansion of forebrain centers in mammals (and other vertebrates with 
elaborated brains) has also not resulted in these regions taking over the functions of lower 
centers. Rather new or parallel functions have been added, complementing and modulating 
existing systems (Jerison, 1973; Sarnat & Netsky, 1981; Walker, 1983; Belekhova & 
Veselkin, 1985).  A good illustration of this is provided by the evolution, in the mammalian 
nervous system, of direct connections from the neocortex to brainstem and spinal cord 
motorneurons. Such connections are not known in non-mammalian vertebrates. This 
development has been linked to the greater precision in digit use of many mammalian groups 
compared with the other amniotes (birds and reptiles) (see Butler & Hodos, 1996). It therefore 
seems likely that the new cortical motor pathways first evolved to provide precise and fine-
grained control over manipulators, complimenting more rudimentary forms of motor control 
supplied by sub-cortical mechanisms. As noted earlier, a dissociation exists such that lesions 
in mammalian motor cortex leave these older, lower-level mechanisms for limb control intact. 
Since a relatively stable brain architecture had already evolved in the first vertebrates, 
evidence for stages in the evolution of this basic plan must be sought in the elaboration of that 
system from the nervous systems of invertebrate ancestors. Vertebrates belong to the 
chordate phylum whose members all possess, at some stage in their development, a single, 
hollow nerve cord (the neural tube) which runs most of the length of the longitudinal body 
axis. Unfortunately, our knowledge of the evolution of the first vertebrate nervous systems 
from those of earlier chordates is largely speculative. There is no fossil evidence to speak of, 
and only one contemporary chordate, Branchiostoma (previously known as Amphioxus), that 
has a nervous system that resembles a possible transitional stage between other chordates and 
the vertebrates. Indirect evidence derived from the different branches of comparative biology 
is the main source of constraint for scenarios for the early evolution of the brain (e.g. Gans & 
Northcutt, 1983; Gans, 1989; Fritzsch, 1995; Butler & Hodos, 1996), while ongoing work 
tracing gene expression in neural tissue (e.g. Holland & Graham, 1995) represents the most 
promising prospect for resolving the many remaining arguments and uncertainties. Here, we 
briefly summarize a possible scenario (based on Gans & Northcutt, 1983; Holland & Graham, 
1995; Northcutt, 1996) for the progression from an ancestral chordate nervous system to that 
of the first vertebrates.  
The initial prevertebrate chordate was probably a filter-feeder with a segmented neural 
tube and an epidermal nerve net linking simple, unicellular sense organs. An intermediate 
stage involved the expansion of the neural tube to form the spinal cord and development of 
the hindbrain as a specialization of the most anterior segments of the tube. These changes 
accompanied the initial development of an anterior head with multicellular sense organs and 
probably coincided with a shift to a more active lifestyle based on predation. As the anterior 
sense organs became increasingly elaborated, integrative neural systems developed anterior to 
the hindbrain and formed the precursors of the vertebrate midbrain and diencephalon. The 
nervous system of Branchiostoma, though primitive in terms of the complexity of its sensory 
systems, contains possible homologues of various sub-regions of the hindbrain, and, more 
                                                                                                                                                            
view of brain evolution based on assumptions of a scalae naturae of increasing complexity 
from jawless fish to modern mammals (Hodos, 1982; Butler and Hodos, 1996). 
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controversially, of the midbrain and diencephalon (Lacalli, 1996; Northcutt, 1996), and may 
partially reflect this evolutionary stage. The telencephalon is generally believed to be a later 
addition to the prevertebrate brain although its evolutionary origins remain obscure. 
The above observations allow us to consider some possible parallels between vertebrate 
brain evolution and the design process proposed by Brooks. 
First, speculative scenarios for the early evolution of the vertebrate brain suggest that the 
more rostral (forward) brain centers may have been added to an ancestral nervous-system 
dominated first by the spinal cord (neural tube), and then by gradually elaborated hindbrain, 
midbrain, and forebrain components. This early phase of brain evolution was evidently more 
rapid than was previously thought and the basic architecture was probably in place with the 
appearance of the first jawless fish.  Some aspects of this early brain evolution can perhaps be 
characterized as “incremental,” for instance, it has been suggested that the hindbrain, which 
has clearly segmented structure, may have evolved by duplication and functional 
diversification of anterior segments of the ancestral neural tube (Metcalfe, Mendelson & 
Kimmel, 1986). In general, however, it has proved difficult, given the antiquity of these 
developments, to distinguish the addition of new brain structures from the co-option and 
adaptation of anterior structures already existing in an ancestral animal. 
Second, the history of brain evolution within the vertebrate sub-phylum can be best 
understood as adaptation and divergence within the framework provided by the basic 
vertebrate brain plan. Some parallels with Brooks’ view may exist, however, in the further 
evolution of the telencephalon in certain vertebrate groups, as exemplified by the expansion 
of cerebral cortex in mammals. Such changes may not be incremental in a strict sense (again, 
it is not clear to what extent they involve the genesis of new neural centers rather than the 
elaboration of existing ones), however, they demonstrate that where “new” higher-level motor 
and sensory systems have evolved these usually arise alongside existing centers which retain 
much of their original functionality. 
Functional Change in Vertebrate Neural Circuitry 
Over the course of evolution, successive radiations of vertebrates have invaded an 
increasingly diverse array of habitats and behavioral niches and, in so doing, have undergone 
several major transformations in morphology and behavior. In many new adaptive zones, the 
functional requirements that some neural circuits first evolved to satisfy will have altered or 
even disappeared, and the nervous system will have been required to support a variety of new 
perceptual, behavioral, and cognitive functions. A key issue which is still largely unresolved 
is the degree to which functional change has occurred by augmenting and modulating existing 
structures as opposed to radically reorganizing such structures. Here we summarize evidence 
that supports the first possibility—new functions arising without radical change to the 
existing nervous system organization.  
A number of findings demonstrate that seemingly dramatic changes in function can take 
place through only minor alterations in cellular and connectional arrangements.  For example, 
the spinal pattern generators that originally evolved to drive the undulatory movements of fish 
swimming have probably adapted to support the different stepping patterns observed in 
limbed vertebrates through a number of simple changes in the coupling and relative frequency 
of the network oscillators (Cohen, 1988).  Wilczynski (1984) has suggested that major 
changes in peripheral sensory and motor apparatus may generally have been accommodated 
by a limited reorganization of central mechanisms. The flexibility to support such 
transformations arises, in part, through developmental processes that allow local areas to self-
organize so as to accommodate change in circuits from which they receive inputs or to which 
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they project outputs (see also Finlay, Wikler & Sengelaub, 1987; Deacon, 1990). There is also 
flexibility inherent in most neural circuits that allows them to be reconfigured into new modes 
of operation, without significant structural change, by modulation of their various cellular and 
synaptic constituents (Getting, 1989; Harris-Warrick, 1991). As a result, new functions may 
be obtained from existing circuits simply by the addition of appropriate modulatory inputs 
from other control centers. This mode of functional change has a striking parallel to Brooks’ 
approach of obtaining new behaviors from established control circuitry by using subsumption 
mechanisms.  
Kavanau (1990) has reviewed a number of arguments for the conservation of the 
redundant functions of neural circuitry through evolution.  He claims that, as many neural 
circuits are multi-functional (see also Getting, 1989), natural selection will rarely operate to 
remove obsolete behaviors by physically excising the underlying neural pathways.6 Instead, 
the elimination of behaviors is more likely to take place through the suppression or 
neutralization of redundant functions (using predominantly inhibitory connections), leaving 
the adaptive functions of the same neural circuits intact. The latent potential of brain circuitry 
to support redundant functions is shown in the observation of relict (i.e. ancient, no longer 
adaptive) behaviors that can be elicited in many vertebrates under circumstances of unusual 
stimulation, following brain damage, or during maturation (for examples see Kavanau, 1990). 
Again, in the suppression rather than excision of redundant functionality, we see a principle 
that brain evolution shares with the SA. 
The above discussion has emphasized the conservative nature of neural evolution 
underlying functional change. It must be recognized, however, that there has been 
considerable change in the microstructural organization of many brain regions. This has 
included change in the size of cell groups, the addition of new cell types, and the migration of 
cell groups within the brain. Connectional changes have included increased differentiation of 
local areas through selective connection loss and axonal invasion of new areas. The relative 
importance and frequency of these different forms of microstructural change remains under 
dispute (Northcutt, 1984; Deacon, 1990; Fritzsch, 1995; Butler & Hodos, 1996), however, it 
is evident that significant reorganization of existing structures has taken place during 
vertebrate brain evolution. In this respect, Brooks’ proposal to finalize the design of lower 
layers before higher layers are added represents a significantly more constrained way of 
building a control system than has taken place in the evolution of the vertebrate nervous 
system. Restricting change to the newest layer may prove a useful pragmatic constraint for 
first attempts at designing complex robot controllers. In the longer-term, however, the use of 
self-organization in the construction of control modules, and the development of methods that 
directly manipulate system dynamics (e.g. Schoner et al., 1995), might enable the design of 
behavior-based robots that retain more inherent flexibility at multiple levels of the evolving 
control system. 
4 THE BEHAVIOR SYSTEMS APPROACH 
One of the aspects of Brooks' SA that has had most impact is his proposal for a behavioral 
decomposition of the control system. Although there are earlier precedents for a behavior-
oriented, and biologically-inspired, approach to robot control (for instance Walter, 1953), 
Brooks’ work has been one of the main inspirations for the currently renewed interest in this 
                                                      
6This conservatism is a characteristic of central neural circuits, redundant peripheral systems, 
however, such as unused sensory circuits, are more likely to be uni-functional,  and therefore 
are more likely to be eliminated in evolution (Kavanau, 1990). 
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field and has helped to initiate a more widespread move toward behavior-based artificial 
intelligence (Maes, 1992). The aim of this section is to briefly consider behavior-oriented 
control from a biological viewpoint. Specifically, we focus on work in ethology and 
psychology which has advocated a behavior systems approach to understanding animal 
behavior, and on neuroscientific evidence for behavioral decomposition in the architecture of 
the vertebrate nervous system. 
The behavior systems approach in ethology is most closely associated with the work of 
Baerends, though it draws ideas and influences from many sources including the theoretical 
statements of Lorenz and Tinbergen (see references in Baerends, 1976). Baerends’ approach 
begins with Lorenz's hierarchical hypothesis for the functional organization of behavior. This 
partitions the behavioral control of the animal into multiple levels with subordination of lower 
level "motivational states" by higher level ones, and with inhibition between states at the 
same level. Within this architecture, Baerends advocates a further decomposition into 
behavior systems which he defines as "relatively independent units" composed of "control 
systems of different orders [i.e. levels] fulfilling special tasks or sub-tasks in the context of a 
hierarchical organization" (Baerends, 1976, p. 736). At the systems level he has in mind 
decomposition into the major motivational systems such as defense, feeding, reproduction, 
body care, and so on. While at lower levels, each of these major systems breaks down into 
groups of related actions aimed at very specific behavioral goals. Figure 2 shows Baerends’ 
example for the case of three interacting systems (and their sub-systems) in the behavior of 
the herring gull. Baerends emphasizes (as we have in Section 2) that his notion of hierarchy is 
sufficiently loose to allow feedback loops between different levels. He also recognizes 
interconnections and overlap between the various systems at multiple levels describing the 
whole as "an organization of interconnected networks" (Baerends, 1976, p. 731).  
The behavior systems approach first emerged from ethological research and therefore 
provides a functional decomposition of animal behavior that need not map, in any direct 
fashion, onto the anatomical organization of the nervous system. Baerends expected, 
however, that the functional organization he described would somehow be reflected in the 
underlying neurophysiology.  The literature on dissociations reviewed earlier suggests that the 
capacity to organize component movements into complex acts, and thence into motivated 
behaviors, involves increasingly rostral brain components. This indicates an interesting 
parallel between Baerend’s hierarchy and the layered architecture of the vertebrate brain: 
higher-level brain circuits, by modulating and coordinating lower-level systems, appear to be 
necessary for generating the higher levels of functional integration recognized in vertebrate 
behavior. 
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Figure 2.  Model of behavior systems in the herring gull from Baerends (1970). The 
right-hand column shows the elementary behaviors or “fixed action patterns”.  To the left of 
these are the superimposed first and second order control systems (N= nesting system, E= 
escape system, P= preening system). The main behavior systems mutually inhibit one 
another. Reprinted from Baerends (1970) by permission of Brill Publishers. 
There may also be physiological correlates for Baerends' decomposition of the control 
system into distinct behavioral units. Although, in general, the neural circuits underlying a 
specific behavior may be distributed and involved in implementing other functions, a degree 
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of behavioral organization can be recognized in the vertebrate brain. For instance, the 
organization of parts of the spinal cord can be decomposed into simple movements (e.g. 
Bizzi, Giszter, Loeb et al., 1995), and parts of the midbrain and hindbrain into sets of 
coordinated movements (e.g. Depaulis, Keay & Bandler, 1992). A behavioral or movement-
based organization has also been proposed for cortical motor systems, a suggestion that 
originated (once again) with Hughlings Jackson (1884/1958), although it remains 
controversial (see e.g. Humphrey, 1986; Wise, 1993). An example of behavioral 
decomposition in the nervous system will be given in Section 5 when we consider the 
organization of mid-brain defense systems in the rat.  
An explicitly physiological interpretation of the behavior systems view has been adopted 
by Fanselow and Sigmundi (1987), who require that a behavior system, in addition to meeting 
certain ethological criteria, has an identifiable neural substrate. Further research relating the 
behavior systems approach to neurobehavioral and developmental studies has been reviewed 
by Timberlake (1993). 
5 THE RAT DEFENSE SYSTEM VIEWED AS A 
SUBSUMPTION ARCHITECTURE 
Brooks’ SA provides a candidate architecture for distributed and layered robot control 
loosely inspired by evolutionary principles, while neuroscience shows empirical evidence for 
a layered control architecture in the vertebrate. Research in robotics, ethology, and 
neuroscience also suggests that behavior-oriented control may be a further valuable 
organizing principle for controlling a complex autonomous agent. To see if these parallels at a 
general level can be applied to a specific example of nervous system organization, this section 
looks in more detail at a specific vertebrate behavior system—the defense system of the rat. 
We focus on the rat defense system because it has undergone detailed scrutiny by researchers 
from a variety of disciplines, however, many of the general features we describe for this 
system are likely to have parallels in other behavior systems in the vertebrate brain. 
The defense system of the rat can be viewed as a behavior system in the sense suggested 
by Baerends and others (Baerends, 1976; Fanselow & Sigmundi, 1987; Davey, 1989). 
Although widely distributed within the rat brain, and partly enmeshed with other neural 
mechanisms, it can therefore be considered as a relatively independent unit. Contemporary 
research in the neurobiology of rat behavior suggests that the defense system is organized as 
layered architecture in which higher level components provide increasingly sophisticated 
solutions to the problems of reducing and avoiding harm. The following summarizes this 
evidence and argues that the rat defense system shows some remarkable architectural 
similarities to Brooks’ SA. 
Layered Organization of Neural Mechanisms of Defense 
The basic architecture of the rat defense system is illustrated in Figure 3. Each level in 
this architecture exploits a specialized subset of sensory processing mechanisms and 
connections to motor/autonomic outputs and, when activated by appropriate stimuli, is 
capable of delivering a set of appropriate adaptive reactions.  The output of all levels appears 
to be relayed to a relatively restricted set of motor, autonomic, and hormonal effector units 
(Yardley & Hilton, 1986). 
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Figure 3.  Layered organization of neural mechanisms of defense: higher level 
components provide increasingly sophisticated solutions to problems of reducing and 
avoiding harm. The nature of the sensory input, the principle brain structures involved, and 
the nature of the defense reaction are indicated for each level. See text for further explanation. 
 
The following sub-sections describe the different layers of the rat defense system 
beginning with the lowest. 
Spinal cord systems support avoidance of actual and imminent harm.  The lowest 
level of the defense system deals with the problem of actual or imminent harm caused by 
noxious, contact stimuli. In the rat, as in other mammals, such mechanisms typically involve 
simple reflex withdrawal. For instance, if the rat's tail or paw touches something hot, a 
withdrawal reflex mediated at the level of the spinal cord removes the limb from the source of 
harm.  
The capacity to perform similar escape responses probably existed in early chordates 
prior to the evolution of an anterior brain and multicellular sense organs.  For instance, Gans 
(1989) has suggested that a simple “tail-flick” reflex, causing the sudden displacement of a 
floating animal, may have preceded the capacity for undulatory locomotion in the evolution 
of the prevertebrate motor system. 
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Hindbrain  mechanisms provide rapid responses to stimuli that warn of possible 
harm.  The sudden appearance of a visual or auditory stimulus is often linked with the 
possibility of physical harm. For a mammal, an adaptive response in these circumstances is to 
tense the somatic musculature. In the rat, a good example of this layer of the defense system 
is provided by the circuits that mediate the acoustic startle response (ASR) (Davis, 1984). 
These pathways, located entirely in the hindbrain and spinal cord, constitute the first interface 
between the anterior sense organs and the motor systems that deliver defensive behavior.  
Hindbrain defense circuitry is highly conserved in vertebrates—for instance, the circuits 
underlying rat acoustic startle may be largely homologous to escape circuitry found in fish 
nervous systems (Lingenhohl & Friauf, 1994). Such mechanisms may have originated with 
the first truly mobile chordates as evolutionary developments that allowed sustained and co-
ordinated forward locomotion encouraged the concentration of sensory systems and neural 
tissue at the anterior end of the animal (Gans, 1989; Fetcho, 1992). 
Midbrain systems organize co-ordinated responses to harm.  Intermediate level 
systems located primarily in the midbrain add further sophistication to both sensory and 
motor aspects of defensive behavior. Sensory systems provide for both the recognition and 
localization of distant, potentially threatening stimuli, while motor systems organize co-
ordinated patterns of defense activity. This level provides the first means by which the animal 
can respond proactively to specific signs of danger.  
A good example of an intermediate level defense mechanism is the acoustic sensory 
processing provided by the midbrain inferior colliculus which is considerably more 
discriminating than the hindbrain circuitry for the ASR. Sensory filters in the inferior 
colliculus7 have evolved to recognize species-specific stimuli indicative of threat (Casseday & 
Covey, 1996), and depending on the characteristics of those stimuli, to trigger responses such 
as freezing and escape behavior (Brandao, Melo & Cardoso, 1993).  
Vision can also provide early warning of potential danger. A large body of research 
demonstrates a key role for midbrain circuitry in visually-triggered defense behavior. For 
example, experiments reviewed by the Blanchards (1987) show that the distance to a sighted 
threat is critical in determining the defense strategy of a wild rat. Freeze is the characteristic 
response at long-range (> 10m), and flight at intermediate distances (5–10m) where an escape 
route is available, with speed of flight varying directly with the distance to the stimulus. 
When the distance to the threat is less than 0.5m the response changes abruptly from flight to 
defensive vocalization then, at even closer range, to a wild jumping and biting attack. 
Redgrave and Dean (1991) have suggested that a set of filters in the midbrain superior 
colliculus are differentially sensitive to the distance of a potential threat. According to this 
hypothesis, each filter is tuned to different levels and rates of darkening of the retina, and 
separately wired to motor systems delivering appropriate responses. 
Compared with simple withdrawal or startle, escape and avoidance often involve the 
vigorous use of many muscles.  This requires the development of: (a) systems that can co-
ordinate the complicated movements involved in “flight” and “fight;” and (b) autonomic and 
endocrine systems that can sustain the increased energy requirements of vigorous activity.  
Motor circuits in the brainstem, for instance in the reticular formation and midbrain 
periaqueductal gray, provide for these co-ordinated patterns of muscular activity. The 
hypothalamus, although located in the forebrain diencephalon, is a further important 
                                                      
7The inferior and superior colliculi are the mammalian homologues of the midbrain tectum 
shown in figure 1. 
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intermediate level center involved in mid- to long-term hormonal and autonomic control of 
defense reactions. The capacity to continue a behavior in the absence of the original stimulus 
is vital for effective defense (an animal will not live long that stops running when the predator 
moves behind a bush!), and one of the functions of hormonal control initiated by the 
hypothalamus may be to maintain elements of the defense reaction after the disappearance of 
the initial trigger.8 
Transection studies, in which all of the forebrain above the hypothalamus is removed (i.e. 
the limbic system and cortex) show that mammalian midbrain defense systems can be 
dissociated from higher level control systems (see reviews in Van Sommers, 1972; Gallistel, 
1980). Released from the largely inhibitory control of forebrain systems these mechanisms 
will operate whenever the relevant triggers are presented regardless of whether they are 
appropriate in the wider context. 
Homologues of mammalian midbrain systems will have been at least partially present in 
the first vertebrates (Northcutt, 1996) and are found with many ancient features still intact in 
all modern vertebrate classes (King & Comer, 1996; Butler & Hodos, 1996). Lacalli (1996) 
has argued that the nervous system of Branchiostoma, although tiny in size and cell number, 
contains homologues of the vertebrate eye, diencephalon, midbrain tectum, and brainstem 
motor areas. If correct, this would suggest that the intermediate level of organization 
described here may have originated in the nervous systems of the later chordate ancestors of 
the first vertebrates.9 
Forebrain systems learn that arbitrary stimuli can be predictive of harm.  At higher 
levels of the rat defense system, arbitrary events can be associated with harm and used as 
triggers for the full suite of defense reactions. The limbic system (the amygdala, 
hippocampus, and septum in Figure 1), and the amygdala in particular, appear to play a key 
role in the acquisition of these associations. 
 The amygdala receives sensory information of every modality alongside signals 
associated with pain and distress which arrive, probably directly, from the brainstem. Its 
outputs go to the various behavioral, autonomic and endocrine mechanisms through which 
defense reactions are commonly expressed. Classical conditioning in the amygdala allows a 
neutral stimulus (such as the presence of a light) to be associated with pain signals (such as a 
harmful footshock), such that after a few pairings, defensive reactions are evoked by the 
neutral stimulus alone  (see Ledoux, 1995). This is termed a conditioned emotional response.  
The amygdala therefore appears to operate by putting an “emotional stamp” on any sensory 
input which is present at the same time, or occurs just before, something nasty. When the 
same stimulus occurs again it is given immediate access to the defense circuitry. By linking 
aversive triggers with formerly neutral cues, this mechanism allows a defense reaction to be 
continued until the animal has moved to a safer environment. The amygdala therefore 
provides a more refined means of controlling long-term defense behavior than is possible 
through midbrain and hypothalamic mechanisms alone. 
For simple stimulus features, the ability to acquire a conditioned response appears to be 
dissociated from the highest cortical centers. For example, subcortical sensory structures can 
                                                      
8In situated robotics the device of “time-outs” is often used for a similar, if cruder, effect. 
9Indeed, taking Branchiostoma as a model may underestimate the complexity of later 
prevertebrates. Being a filter-feeder rather than a predator it lacks the well developed sense 
organs and associated neural systems that such creatures are likely to have possessed (Gans, 
1989). 
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provide, via the thalamus, the input for the conditioned emotional response to a simple tone or 
light (see Davis 1992; Ledoux, 1995). Learning, in both these circumstances, is unaffected by 
lesions to auditory or visual cortex. 
Cortical systems provide additional tiers of  input to the amygdala.  Further analyses 
of significant environmental events are performed in sensory cortex and in cortical 
association areas—structures which also have direct output projections to the amygdala. The 
hippocampus and septum also project to the amygdala providing access to additional 
contextual knowledge that can help the animal to distinguish between threatening and non-
threatening situations. Ledoux (1992) suggests that thalamic, cortical, and hippocampal areas 
provide the amygdala with "three tiers" of sensory and contextual information. 
The limbic system (including homologues of the mammalian amygdala) is present in all 
vertebrates although data on the earliest vertebrate class (the jawless fish) is sparse 
(Belekhova, 1990). It therefore seems likely that the role of the amygdala in assessing the 
biological significance of sense data, and modulating lower level behavioral and autonomic 
sub-systems, was established early in vertebrate evolution. The amygdaloid nuclei become 
differentiated in the transition from amphibians to reptiles, and undergo further, though less 
substantive, change in the transition to mammals (Bruce & Neary, 1995). These 
developments appear to give the expanded forebrain cognitive and sensory sub-systems of 
later vertebrates access to the same basic machinery for acquired emotional responses. 
Frontal cortex may unlearn associations between arbitrary stimuli and harm.  Such are the 
vagaries of life that an acquired association between a stimulus and harm can later cease to be 
appropriate.  LeDoux (1995) has suggested that a yet higher level of competence is required 
to unlearn some associations between arbitrary stimuli and harm. This proposal arose from 
experiments on the conditioned emotional response that began by pairing a tone with an 
electric shock. After relatively few trials, defense reactions to the tone were well established, 
at which point the shock was turned off so that the tone no longer predicted the aversive 
stimulus. Very gradually, over several weeks, the conditioned emotional reactions to the tone 
subsided and eventually disappeared. Once extinction had occurred, restricted lesions were 
placed in the frontal cortex. On the first trial following these lesions the conditioned 
emotional response (i.e. to the tone alone) re-emerged at full strength.  
This remarkable result suggests that acquired associations between conditioned and 
unconditioned stimuli at the level of the amygdala remained intact throughout the extinction 
period. Instead, it appears that the frontal cortex gradually learned that the tone was no longer 
dangerous and established an appropriate inhibitory connection to the amygdala. When the 
frontal cortex was lesioned, this modulating inhibitory input was lost releasing the emotional 
link between the tone and defense reactions. This form of extinction thus appears to involve 
not the eradication of a learned response but active inhibition of that response by a higher 
level system. 
This component of the defense system has been demonstrated only in the mammalian 
forebrain. However, other highly encephalised vertebrate groups (e.g. birds) may have 
evolved similar mechanisms. 
Parallels between the Rat Defense System and the Subsumption Architecture 
The above review paints a fascinating picture of the defense system in the rat brain. The 
similarities to a subsumption architecture are clear and can be summarized as follows: 
Distributed control.  The defense system is composed of multiple, vertically organized, 
sub-systems operating in parallel. Each level makes an important contribution to the 
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functionality of the whole system. If the higher layers of the system were to “take over” to the 
extent that lower level mechanisms became more or less vestigial, then this would be 
permissible under an SA, but is clearly against the spirit of Brooks’ proposal.  This does not 
seem to be true of the defense system as described above—the different layers make distinct 
and important contributions.  
Behavioral decomposition.  Although much of the neural circuitry in the vertebrate brain 
appears to be multifunctional, there is some evidence of dissociations between the defense 
system and other behavior systems in the rat brain, and of a finer-grained behavior-based 
organization within the defense system itself.  Both of these points are illustrated by research 
on visual response circuitry in the rat midbrain.  
First, studies of the superior colliculus reviewed by Dean, Redgrave and Westby (1989) 
indicate the presence of at least two separate visual response systems in rat midbrain, one 
specialized for orienting movements such as tracking and pursuit, the other for defensive 
behaviors such as avoidance and flight. These two systems appear to rely on separate and 
dissociable pathways to brainstem/spinal cord motor systems. Similar findings in frogs (King 
& Comer, 1996) suggest that this separation may be a general characteristic of the vertebrate 
midbrain. 
Second, within the midbrain defense system, evidence for a behavior-based organization 
of defense reactions is found in the lateral midbrain periaqueductal gray—the intermediate 
level brain structure responsible for coordinating many lower-level  defense reactions. For 
instance, backward defense behavior, characterized by backing off and defensive rearing, and 
forward defense behavior, characterized by forward locomotion and occasional jumping, 
appear to be supported by two neighboring but distinct populations of neurons (Depaulis et 
al., 1992). As we have already suggested, these two contrasting defense responses may be 
triggered by separate filters in the superior colliculus tuned to different forms of visual threat 
(Redgrave & Dean, 1991). 
Increasing levels of competences.  At ascending levels the defense system show 
increased ability to anticipate danger and greater complexity of response. Lower level defense 
reactions do not depend on higher level structures and will operate when triggered unless 
actively inhibited by higher levels. There is a dissociation between levels such that damage to 
higher level structures leaves lower level behaviors relatively unimpaired. 
Incremental construction.  As we pointed out in Section 3 the antiquity of the basic 
vertebrate brain plan makes it difficult to establish definitively whether the finding of a 
layered nervous system architecture is indicative of a phylogenetic sequence. We have noted 
above that all but the highest levels of the defense architecture are shared across all the 
vertebrate classes but may have evolved in a loosely incremental fashion in prevertebrates. 
There is generally good evidence of conservation of lower level defense circuitry through 
evolution. 
Communication between levels by subsumption mechanisms.  Anatomical studies 
indicate that outputs from higher level modules such as the amygdala and cerebral cortex 
converge on lower somatomotor, autonomic and endocrine output units.  Thus higher level 
systems act by modulating outputs generated at lower layers.  In the rat defense system we 
see several examples of subsumption-like mechanisms that implement this modulation. 
First, higher-level systems can coordinate multiple lower level mechanisms. This is 
observed in the coordinated control, by mid-brain defense sub-systems, of sets of lower-level 
reflex and pattern-generating mechanisms.  
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Second, higher-level systems can provide substitute inputs to lower-level output 
mechanisms in the absence of primary noxious sensory information impinging on the lower 
layer. This is evident in the conditioned emotional response where low-level defense 
reactions can be triggered by arbitrary and potentially complex configurations of non-noxious 
sensory stimuli.  A further example is the task of orienting to the position of a remembered, 
and previously dangerous, target. In such situations, high level systems clearly must impose 
control without low-level sensory input. Thus, the low-level gaze positioning system (the 
other principle function of the superior colliculus) operates regardless of whether its input 
denotes a direct stimulus or a remembered object (Wurtz & Hikosaka, 1986).   
Third, higher level systems can inhibit those below. This is essential if one is to avoid 
assaulting the dentist while he/she is drilling your teeth! A more formal example, described 
above, is the continuous inhibitory signal10 from the frontal cortex to the amygdala that allows 
unlearning of the conditioned emotional response. 
Finally, lower level reactions can be modulated by simple mechanisms such as gain 
control.11 An example of this is the potentiated acoustic startle response (Davis, 1992) in 
which the amplitude of a low level reflex behavior is dramatically enhanced when the animal 
is in a “fearful” state initiated by a higher level module. This potentiation of the startle 
response is caused by an output from the amygdala that taps into the lower level reflex arc. 
Limited sensor fusion at lower levels, no central models.  Signals from the different 
sensory modalities converge on motor and pre-motor defense mechanisms throughout the 
brain. This capacity to respond to threat stimuli from multiple modalities does not imply, 
however, that signals from the different senses are always combined to form unified 
representations. Indeed, in the context of brainstem defense sub-systems it seems more likely 
that the modalities supply relatively independent triggers or combine in a fashion that 
depends on fairly simple stimulus properties such as intensity. Where there is evidence for 
more sophisticated forms of sensor fusion, higher levels of the nervous system are usually 
implicated. For instance, in mammalian brains, near–threshold visual and auditory threat 
signals from sources that correspond in place will combine to form a more effective trigger 
than either stimulus presented alone or both stimuli presented in different places (Meredith & 
Stein, 1983). In other words, seeing the branch twitch and hearing the leaves rustle will 
increase the likelihood of a reaction, but only if these two events occur at the same location. 
Wallace and Stein (1997) have recently shown that this solution to the spatial correspondence 
problem critically relies on circuitry in the associative cortex—animals in which the relevant 
cortical areas are temporally inactivated, and infant animals in which cortex is not fully 
matured, fail to show this cross-modal sensory enhancement.  
The dissociations, noted above, between the different layers of the defense system 
demonstrate that separate sensor processing channels exist at multiple levels of the brain. 
Lower-level channels, which may exploit relatively fast, task-specific, pattern recognition 
mechanisms (such as the sensory filters in the superior colliculus) appear to be independent of 
representations established in higher layers, Brooks’ notion of “abstraction barriers” is thus at 
least partially respected. 
                                                      
10It is interesting to note that this exact form of subsumption control (continuous, active 
inhibition) was a refinement that was added to the original SA (Brooks, 1989) to replace 
inhibitory mechanisms based on time-outs.  
11This can be implemented in the subsumption architecture by a high-level input that 
subsumes the role of a constant gain parameter in the lower-level system. 
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In summary, the above correspondences would appear sufficient to justify our view that 
the architecture of the defense system shares many interesting characteristics with Brooks’ 
SA. 
6 ACTION SELECTION IN LAYERED CONTROL 
ARCHITECTURES 
A problem of conflict resolution arises whenever multiple functional units are in 
competition for a limited set of effectors. At any time only one directing system can generally 
be allowed control of a given set of motor outputs. In the adaptive behavior literature this 
situation is commonly referred to as an action selection problem (Tyrrell, 1992; Maes, 1995). 
A frequent criticism of Brooks' SA by authors otherwise sympathetic to the behavior-based 
approach concerns the inflexible nature of the conflict resolution that can be achieved by 
subsumption mechanisms (Rosenblatt & Payton, 1989; Maes, 1990; Blumberg, 1994; 
Schoner et al., 1995). Brooks has noted that the problem of designing an appropriate 
subsumption scheme becomes harder as more control layers are added and has investigated a 
number of extended architectures that include mechanisms designed to improve action 
selection (Brooks, 1995). This is clearly an area where insights from natural control systems 
could prove useful in robot design. 
The problem of resolving conflicts between competing behaviors has been an important 
focus of research in ethology (see. e.g. McFarland, 1971; Colgan, 1989), which has 
contributed a number of important conceptual and control-theoretic models, some of which 
have been evaluated in computer simulations (e.g. Ludlow, 1976; Houston & Sumida, 1985).  
Recent research in adaptive behavior has partly drawn on these earlier ethological models and 
has also moved towards evaluating candidate action selection mechanisms in more complete 
simulations of the agent and its environment (e.g. Tyrrell, 1992; Blumberg, 1994; Maes, 
1995) or in the control architecture of a genuine mobile robot (Snaith & Holland, 1990; 
Brooks, 1994; Rosenblatt, 1997; McFarland & Spier, 1997). Only limited attention has been 
paid, however, either in the ethology or adaptive behavior literature, to the neural circuitry 
that supports conflict resolution in vertebrate nervous systems. An understanding of the 
functional architecture of such circuits should provide a useful additional source of constraint 
for designing effective, biologically-inspired action selection mechanisms. 
Throughout most of this article we have argued that the vertebrate brain employs vertical, 
subsumption-like mechanisms to implement a layered control architecture. In Section 2, 
however, we noted that the basal ganglia (BG), a group of functionally-related, central brain 
structures, appear to have a controlling influence on neural systems at multiple levels and so 
form an important exception to the overall vertical decomposition of the brain.  We will argue 
below that the core role of the BG is as a specialized action selection mechanism that 
provides a more flexible means of conflict resolution than is possible through subsumption 
mechanisms alone. Before outlining this proposal, however, we briefly review some of the 
requirements for effective action selection and consider whether there is a need for 
specialized selection circuitry within a complex control architecture such as the brain. 
The Action Selection Problem 
The problem of action selection has been considered at length elsewhere (McFarland, 
1989; Snaith & Holland, 1990; Tyrrell, 1992; Maes, 1995). The following therefore focuses 
on a number of issues of particular relevance to the subsequent review of vertebrate conflict 
resolution mechanisms.   
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A basic principle of action selection is that from a set of incompatible competitors only 
one should be allowed expression at a given time. Further requirements for effective action 
selection can be loosely divided into those related to making appropriate selections and those 
concerned with effective switching between competitors.  
With respect to selection, a widely applied heuristic—and one that appears to be exploited 
in vertebrate decision-making (McFarland, 1989)—is to prefer the most strongly supported 
competitor as indicated by relevant external and internal cues. The capacity for a specific 
competitor to prevail in a selection contest should be weighted to provide appropriate 
dominance relationships between different competitors. So, for instance, safety-critical 
competitors (such as defense behaviors) should be able to dominate even in the presence of 
weak triggering stimuli.  In natural control systems we would expect this balance between 
competitors to be adaptable through learning as well as through natural selection.  
In order to facilitate effective and timely switching between competitors, we can identify 
(following Snaith & Holland, 1990) a number of useful properties that an action selection 
mechanism should possess. First, a competitor with a slight edge over its rivals should see the 
competition resolved rapidly and decisively in its favor so providing clean switching. Second, 
the presence of other competitors which are activated but not engaged should not interfere 
with the performance of the winning behavior once the competition has been resolved. This 
can be termed lack of distortion. Both these properties can be provided by mechanisms of a 
winner-takes-all variety. We therefore may expect to find neural circuits that implement 
winner-takes-all involved in action selection in the vertebrate brain.  Finally, it may also be 
useful for a winning competitor to remain active at lower input levels than are initially 
required for it to overcome the competition. This characteristic, termed hysteresis (Snaith & 
Holland, 1990) or persistence (McFarland, 1989), can prevent unnecessary switching and is 
often implemented through some form of non-linear, positive feedback loop (see e.g. Houston 
& Sumida, 1985). 
Conflict resolution between competitors bidding for incompatible uses of a single 
resource is only part of the wider problem of generating coherent behavior (Brooks, 1994). 
Different effector systems, such as the muscle groups underlying locomotion and gaze in 
mammals, constitute more-or-less independent resources, however, it is clearly important that 
their activities are appropriately co-ordinated. For instance, it is generally considered unwise 
to persist in walking forwards while looking backwards! As this example demonstrates, 
selection mechanisms for individual resources need to be embedded within a control 
architecture that can deliver appropriate simultaneous and sequential patterns of activity in 
multiple output systems. 
Is There a Need for Specialized Selection Circuitry in Complex Control Architectures? 
Emergent action selection.  Work in the field of adaptive behavior has been at the 
forefront of the study of emergent functionality (see, e.g. Steels, 1995) where useful 
behavioral outcomes are seen to arise as a consequence or side-effect of the interaction of 
control system components which individually have a different or more limited functionality. 
In such systems no one component is decisive in shaping the overall outcome, and it is 
generally impossible to attribute specific aspects of behavior to the function of individual 
components. Various authors have proposed that effective action selection can arise as an 
emergent function of a suitably configured control system (for review see Maes, 1995). For 
instance, Maes (1990, 1995) has described a control architecture for an “artificial creature” 
which is decomposed into multiple goal-oriented behaviors. In this system there is no specific 
locus at which action selection takes place, rather a network of excitatory and inhibitory 
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connections between behaviors is configured so as to allow an appropriate sequence of 
actions to be generated as the agent interacts with its world. Mutual inhibition between 
incompatible behaviors ensures that they are not allowed simultaneous expression. Maes 
argues that such architectures can allow flexible action selection, of a natural and fluid 
character, that is robust to damage to individual components of the system.  As discussed by 
Kelso (1995), emergent selection is also demonstrated in multi-functional pattern-generating 
networks (such as those underlying vertebrate locomotory behavior) that can be driven by 
small changes in input (or in neuromodulatory substances) to switch from one behavioral 
mode to another. The intrinsic dynamics of these circuits allow clean switching between 
motor patterns without the need for identifiable switching elements. The methodology of 
dynamic systems modeling is proving important in understanding how appropriate, emergent 
switching behavior can be derived from such multi-component control circuits (Kelso, 1995; 
Schoner 1995). 
Specialized action selection.  The alternative to emergent selection is to allocate specific 
components and pathways in the control system to the task of resolving selection conflicts. A 
general argument in favor of such specialized circuitry concerns the advantages of modularity 
in the design of control systems. To the extent that the problem of selection can be 
distinguished from the perceptual and motor control problems involved in coordinating a 
given activity it should be advantageous to decouple the selection mechanism from other 
parts of the control circuitry. As separate components each can be improved or modified 
independently. In contrast, in a circuit that displays emergent selection, a change directed at 
some other aspect of function could impact on the switching behavior of the network with 
possibly undesirable consequences. The advantages incurred by modularity in dissociating 
functionally distinct components of the system are probably as significant for evolved 
systems as they are for engineered ones (Wagner & Altenberg, 1996).  
Specialized action selection mechanisms feature in the behavior-based robot control 
system described by Rosenblatt (1997), which incorporates a central arbitration mechanism in 
an otherwise distributed architecture. Below we summarize evidence indicating that for some 
aspects of selection the vertebrate brain has evolved specialized switching mechanisms that 
are largely decoupled from other aspects of control. 
Distributed selection mechanisms—recurrent reciprocal inhibition.  A specific form 
of neural connectivity, which is often associated with emergent selection, is mutual or 
reciprocal inhibition. At its simplest, reciprocal inhibition is the process, identified by 
Sherrington (1947), whereby a signal that excites a muscle on one side of a joint inhibits the 
antagonistic muscle on the opposite side.  A more complex form arises in networks with 
recurrent reciprocal inhibition (RRI) (see e.g. Gallistel, 1980) where two or more units are 
connected such that each one has an inhibitory link to every other (see Figure 4, left). Such 
circuits display a form of positive feedback since increasing the activation of one unit causes 
increased inhibition on the remaining units thereby reducing their inhibitory effect on the 
first. RRI can therefore support winner-takes-all switching making it an attractive means for 
implementing action selection (Snaith & Holland, 1990). The strengths of incoming 
excitatory links and of the inhibitory links between units can also be tuned to support a 
complex pattern of dominance relationships between competitors. 
RRI is one of principles exploited in Maes (1990) action selection architecture for an 
artificial creature, it has also featured in a number of ethological models of action selection in 
invertebrates (e.g. Ludlow, 1976; Edwards, 1991) and vertebrates (see Tyrrell, 1993).  RRI 
connectivity has been identified in many different areas of the brain (Windhorst, 1996), 
however, its functional role in most situations is not clearly understood. Gallistel (1980) has 
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suggested that such circuits could play a role in conflict resolution at multiple levels of the 
vertebrate nervous system. 
 The distributed nature of RRI means that selection can be viewed as an emergent 
property of the network (Snaith & Holland, 1990). Whether such circuits display emergent 
selection in a stronger sense will depend, however, on whether the reciprocal inhibitory 
connections that implement switching have any further influence ongoing behavior. If it can 
be shown that selection components of such a circuit are dissociable from those involved in 
generating specific behavioral outcomes then the RRI circuitry could be described as 
implementing a specialized, albeit distributed, selection mechanism. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Distributed recurrent reciprocal inhibition network (left), compared with a 
“central switch” selection mechanism (right). The latter has a significant advantage in terms 
of economy of connection costs. Dark arrows indicate one-way inhibitory connections, light 
arrows indicate sensory inputs and motor outputs. 
 
Centralized action selection mechanisms.  Snaith and Holland (1990), following 
McFarland (1965), have contrasted RRI action selection with a system that employs a 
specialized, central switching device (see Figure 4, right). They note that to arbitrate between 
n competitors, an RRI system with full connectivity requires n(n-1) inhibitory connections, 
while adding a new competitor requires a further 2n connections. In contrast, a system which 
uses a central switching device to host and resolve the competition requires only two 
connections per competitor (to and from the switching mechanism) resulting in 2n 
connections in all. Adding a further unit requires only two additional connections. Snaith and 
Holland argue that mechanisms of both kinds can, in principle, exhibit clean switching, 
minimal distortion, and hysteresis. Clearly, however, a central switching device provides a 
significant advantage in terms of economy of connections costs. Except for the overhead of 
the switching device itself, such a system is cheaper to build and maintain than an RRI 
system. Perhaps as importantly, it is also cheaper and easier to increment, so simplifying the 
task of integrating new competitors into an existing system. 
 Ringo (1991) has pointed out that geometrical factors place important limits on the 
degree of network interconnectivity within the brain. In particular, larger brains cannot 
support the same degree of connectivity as smaller ones—significant increases in brain size 
must inevitably be accompanied by decreased connectivity between non-neighboring brain 
areas. Leise (1990) has argued that a common feature of both vertebrate and invertebrate 
nervous systems is that they are composed of anatomically and functionally differentiable 
local compartments which are restricted in size to a maximum of around 1mm diameter. 
Connectivity between neurons is highest within compartments, and larger nervous systems 
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have more compartments rather than larger individual compartments.  One of the constraints 
that appears to limit compartment size is the greater cost of high-bandwidth communication 
over long distances in neural tissue. 
The nature of the action selection problem is such that functional systems in different 
parts of the brain will often be in competition for the same motor resources. The requirements 
of lower connectivity and increased compartmentalization with increased brain size therefore 
strongly favors selection architectures with lower connectional overheads. In the remainder of 
this section we propose that the vertebrate brain exploits specialized action selection 
mechanisms that are instantiated within the basal ganglia. The centralized nature of these 
mechanisms provides an efficient means of arbitrating between functional units that are 
widely distributed in the brain. We will suggest, however, that within the BG distributed 
switching mechanisms are employed in a manner that exploits their capacity for effective 
switching whilst minimizing connectivity costs. 
Structure and Function of the Vertebrate Basal Ganglia viewed as an Action Selection 
Device 
The principle components of the vertebrate BG are the striatum and pallidum found at the 
base of the forebrain and the substantia nigra and ventral tegmental area in the midbrain. 
These structures appear to have homologues in the nervous systems of all classes of jawed 
vertebrates (Medina & Reiner, 1995; Butler & Hodos, 1996), and possibly in all vertebrates 
(Northcutt, 1994). Figure 5 shows the main BG nuclei and some of their intrinsic and 
extrinsic connections within the mammalian brain. 
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Figure 5.  Principle structures of the basal ganglia and some of their intrinsic and 
extrinsic connections in the mammalian brain. Based on Medina and Reiner (1995). 
Abbreviations: SN/VTA—substantia nigra/ventral tegmental area, STN—subthalamic 
nucleus. The direct striatonigral pathway (shown by the large arrow) is found in all jawed 
vertebrates, and possibly in all vertebrates.  
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The proposal that the BG performs action selection in the vertebrate brain is not a radical 
perspective on BG function but rather derives from a growing consensus that a key function 
of these structures is to enable desired actions and to inhibit undesired, potentially competing, 
actions (for reviews see Chevalier & Deniau, 1990; Salamone, 1991; Reiner, 1994; 
Groenewegen, Wright & Beijer, 1996; Mink, 1996; Redgrave, Prescott & Gurney, in press). 
This literature suggests the following view of the functional architecture of the BG.  
Activity relating to “bids” for access to motor apparatus appears to be continuously 
projected to the input side of the BG from relevant functional sub-systems in both the 
brainstem and forebrain of the animal. This activity may form the “common currency” in 
which competing requests for actuating systems can be effectively compared. Internal 
circuitry within the BG then determines a “winner” whose contact with the motor systems is 
specifically disinhibited via its output channel.  
The following briefly summarizes some of key anatomical, neurophysiological, and 
neurobehavioral findings in support of this proposal. 
Inputs to the BG include branched pathways from sensorimotor systems and 
contextual inputs from sensory and motivational  areas.  Anatomical evidence shows that 
cortical and brainstem sensorimotor systems, plus several of the forebrain limbic structures, 
communicate directly with motor and pre-motor mechanisms in the brainstem and spinal 
cord.  However, these systems also project, usually via a collateral (split) pathway, to the 
striatum, the main input center of the BG. This branch could allow them to enter into a 
competition for control of the motor outputs hosted within the BG. Afferents from a wide 
range of sensory and motivational systems also arrive at BG input neurons. These connections 
could allow both extrinsic and intrinsic factors to enter into a "vast machinery" of context-
specific filters in the striatum (Mink, 1996), influencing the strength of rival bids, and hence 
the currently preferred course of action.  The input connectivity of the BG therefore indicates 
that it is well placed to resolve the problem of selecting an appropriate action for a given set 
of circumstances. 
Outputs of the BG selectively inhibit and disinhibit movement generators.  A tonic 
(i.e. continuous) inhibitory signal emerges from the main output centers of the BG (parts of 
the substantia nigra, ventral tegmental area, and pallidum), directed at neural circuits that 
either directly or indirectly generate movement. This inhibitory signal places a powerful 
brake on these movement systems. Commands emanating from the striatum inhibit the 
inhibitory BG output centers thereby disinhibiting selected movement generators. In the 
absence of such commands there can be no voluntary movement. The BG thus seems to hold 
a “veto” over midbrain and forebrain systems that seek access to the motor system; this is 
relinquished, for a selected action, through the mechanism of disinhibition. 
Projection lines through the various sub-components of the basal ganglia appear to be 
largely organized into segregated parallel “channels.” This segregation is maintained in the 
disinhibitory projections to output targets. Behavioral studies indicate that although the 
architecture of these channels is similar throughout most of the BG, different areas are 
functionally heterogeneous. For instance, there appears to be a motor somatotopy in parts of 
rat striatum such that restricted lesions at different locations effect different actions such as 
forelimb manipulation, biting, and gait (see, e.g. Cho & West, 1997). This would suggest that 
the circuitry in these local areas of the BG may primarily be used to resolve conflicts between 
systems bidding for incompatible uses of specific muscle groups. More generally, each local 
group of parallel circuits in the BG may be competing for a single output mechanism thereby 
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forming a single, multi-way “switch.” If this interpretation is correct then the BG as a whole 
may provide an array of similar switching devices. 
Winner-takes-all mechanisms in the BG could support effective switching.  The 
above describes the principle “selection” pathway through the BG. However, the various BG 
nuclei have a rich interconnectivity, partly illustrated in Figure 5, whose function is not well 
understood. For instance, some intrinsic BG pathways have a net-excitatory effect on BG 
output nuclei that results in increased inhibition (rather than disinhibition) of motor 
mechanisms. Mink (1996) has reviewed anatomical and electrophysiological evidence from 
the mammalian BG indicating that the different intrinsic pathways provide complimentary 
mechanisms that act to focus activity in the BG output nuclei.  This evidence suggests that the 
BG could implement a winner-takes-all competition between multiple channels—
disinhibiting a desired channel while maintaining or increasing inhibition on competing 
channels. This proposal that has been explored and developed in our own recent 
computational model of BG intrinsic circuitry (Gurney, Prescott & Redgrave, 1998). If this 
interpretation is correct, it would appear that the BG is appropriately “wired” to provide clean 
switching between actions and lack of distortion in a selected act. A summary of this model 
of the BG as an action mechanism is shown in Figure 6. 
It is interesting to note that RRI circuitry within the striatum probably provides one of the 
mechanisms that resolves the selection competition (Wickens, 1997). The axon collaterals of 
individual striatal neurons typically occupy an area of about 0.5 mm in diameter, so local RRI 
competitions can be expected to occur in regions of approximately this size. Note that this is 
below the 1mm limit suggested by Leise (1990) for compartment size (and therefore low-cost, 
high bandwidth communication) in nervous systems. By implementing RRI within confined 
and very local areas of the striatum the vertebrate brain may have evolved to exploit the 
potential of RRI switching circuits whilst minimizing the cost of inter-competitor 
connectivity—employing a micro-scale distributed switch within a specialized and 
centralized selection mechanism. 
Behavioral effects of BG interventions and damage support a role in behavior 
selection and switching.  Lesions, and neurochemical or electrophysiological interventions in 
BG structures have been shown to effect various aspects of behavior selection and switching 
in a number of different experimental paradigms (see e.g. Gelissen & Cools, 1988; Bakshi & 
Kelley, 1991; Salamone, 1991; Salamone et al., 1997). Depending on the site and nature of 
the intervention, these effects include changes in the dominance relations between behaviors, 
reductions and increases in switching relative to controls, changes in variability of behavior, 
and failure to complete behaviors. The BG therefore appear to be heavily implicated in 
maintaining appropriate frequency and timing of behavior switches in the normal state. 
 The symptoms of various brain disorders associated with the BG also suggest a role in 
action selection. Human disorders in which the BG is implicated include: Parkinson’s disease, 
whose symptoms include slowness and difficulty in making voluntary movements, 
Huntington’s disease and Tourette’s syndrome, characterized by excessive or inappropriate 
movement, and obsessive-compulsive disorders marked by repetition of certain stereotyped 
activities. Recent evidence suggests that these disorders may be related to abnormal levels of 
the neuromodulator dopamine in the BG. An important role of striatal dopamine may be to 
moderate the balance between the different control pathways through the BG (see e.g. Reiner, 
1994). A deficit of dopamine, such as is seen in Parkinson’s, appears to favor the net-
inhibitory pathways within the BG leading to too much inhibition on motor systems. Excess 
dopamine, on the other hand, may favor the disinhibitory (net-excitatory) pathway leading to 
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the excessive movement seen in Huntington’s disease and Tourette’s syndrome, or causing 
certain activities to become over-dominant as seen in obsessive-compulsive disorders. 
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Figure 6.  The BG viewed as an action selection mechanism. The competition between 
multiple sensorimotor mechanisms is resolved in the BG. The winning competitor inhibits 
tonically active neurons in BG output structures which disinhibits required motor 
mechanisms. Other BG intrinsic pathways excite output neurons contributing the increased 
inhibition of losing competitors.   Thicker lines indicate stronger excitatory or inhibitory 
signals. See text for further explanation. 
Action selection in the BG can improve through learning.  The BG are strongly 
implicated in instrumental conditioning and in various forms of sequential learning. An 
important group of neurons in the midbrain BG areas appear to fire in conjunction with 
rewarding events, or prior to anticipated rewarding events. Shultz, Dayan, and Montague 
(1997) have proposed that the afferents from these structures to the striatum may provide a 
training signal similar to the temporal difference error used in artificial reinforcement 
learning methods (see e.g. Barto, 1995). Houk, Adams and Barto (1995) have further 
speculated that something akin to an actor-critic learning system (Barto, 1995) may be 
operating in the BG. Although these comparisons have yet to be fully substantiated, there is 
good evidence that these circuits could support adaptive tuning of selection mechanisms. 
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Evolutionary considerations.  The fundamental architecture of the basal ganglia is 
archaic in evolutionary terms. We have already pointed out that the main basal ganglia nuclei 
have homologues in all the vertebrate groups, it further appears that the neurotransmitter 
organization (cell type) and connectivity patterns of the basal ganglia are largely conserved in 
at least the jawed vertebrates (Medina & Reiner, 1995), and that the striatum occupies a 
roughly similar proportion of forebrain volume in all vertebrate classes (Hodos, 1982). This 
evidence suggests that the BG may be part of the basic vertebrate brain plan. The limited 
neurobehavioral data available for reptiles (Tarr, 1982) and amphibians (Ewert, 1995) adds 
further support to the notion of a core BG function that is similar in all vertebrates.  
An important characteristic of the non-mammalian BG is that the primary output 
pathways are directed to structures in the midbrain (Medina & Reiner, 1995). This would 
suggest that the original role of the BG was to arbitrate between the different demands of 
brainstem sensorimotor systems. With the evolution of corticospinal motor pathways in the 
mammalian brain, selection circuits in the BG may have been recruited to serve a similar role 
with respect to the newer cortical motor systems. 
The Granularity of Selection in the Basal Ganglia.  An important issue concerns the 
granularity of the action selection subserved by the BG. For instance, some researchers have 
proposed a role for the BG in a more fine-grained sequencing of movement than selecting 
between competing behavioral acts (see Mink, 1996, for review). The suggestion that the BG 
is involved in movement sequencing can, however, be reconciled with the view of the BG as 
an action selection device on the grounds that both tasks can be regarded as similar problems 
on somewhat different time-scales. We propose a general hypothesis which appears to be 
consistent with the anatomy of the BG, namely, that similar switching circuitry is employed 
in different regions of the BG to resolve selection problems at different levels of functional 
integration. Specifically, the BG is widely described as having three main territories termed 
the limbic, associative, and motor domains (Gerfen & Wilson, 1996; Joel & Weiner, 1994). 
These areas have similar intrinsic circuitry but different extrinsic connectivity. There is 
evidence that the limbic striatum (also termed the nucleus accumbens) receives connections 
from many areas of the brain that are involved in generating motivated behavior  (see 
Groenewegen et al., 1996). It seems possible, therefore, that competitions at higher levels of 
functional integration are resolved in the limbic domain of the BG. At the other end of the 
scale, the motor domain appears to be specialized to resolve conflicts for specific muscle 
groups, suggesting a role in selection at a comparatively low levels of functional 
integration—choosing between incompatible motor patterns.  The role of the associative 
domain is less clearly characterized by existing research, however, a possibility arising from 
the current theory is that it plays a role in selection at intermediate levels, for instance, in 
choosing between co-ordinated movement sequences. Joel and Weiner (1994) provide a 
useful review of some of the neural circuitry that might mediate interactions between the 
different striatal domains. This evidence suggests that such interactions are likely to be 
indirect (i.e. involve structures outside the BG), however, they will clearly be important in co-
ordinating appropriate patterns of selection at multiple spatial and temporal scales. 
The Brain Without the Basal Ganglia.  Further insight into the role of the BG within 
the overall control architecture of the vertebrate brain can be gained by considering 
circumstances in which BG circuitry is either disconnected or inoperative. For instance, a 
number of studies have looked at the effect of blocking the outputs from the basal ganglia to 
the rat superior colliculus (see Dean et al., 1989). From our perspective this can viewed as 
jamming the switching circuit into the “on” position (no BG inhibition of collicular output 
systems).  In these circumstances the animal has no difficulty in co-ordinating the head and 
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mouth movements required to locate and bite an object moving in its whisker field, however, 
the animal also appears unable to resist orienting to any tactile stimulus placed in the whisker 
field and fails to habituate to such a stimulus (Dean et al., 1989; Redgrave, personal 
observation). This inability to suppress an activated, but non-salient, sensorimotor system 
indicates a dissociation between the circuitry which controls switching (in the BG), and that 
which controls planning and execution of the motor act (in the colliculus and brainstem). 
Other research has looked at the effect of jamming the BG in the “off” position. For instance, 
Teitelbaum and co-workers have performed extensive observational studies using animals 
with lesions of the lateral hypothalmus (reviewed in Teitelbaum et al, 1983; Teitelbaum, 
Pellis & Pellis, 1990). Such lesions destroy the dopaminergic inputs to the striatum, rendering 
the disinhibitory BG pathway inoperative, and resulting in continuous inhibition of all motor 
systems. Experimental animals show no spontaneous, environmentally-oriented movement 
for a day or so after the lesion operation and must be tube-fed to stay alive. With time, 
however, the ability to perform co-ordinated movements recovers to the extent that the animal 
will walk around, explore, and eat any palatable food it encounters.  Behavior-generating 
mechanisms in the brain thus appear to be able to adapt so as to compensate for malfunction 
in the BG switching circuitry.  What fails to recover, however, is the natural ease with which 
intact animals organize their actions into coherent motivated sequences. For example, 
recovered animals, whose behavior appears relatively normal, will often walk into a corner 
and stand for a long time making stereotyped stepping and head-scanning movements. 
Teitelbaum et. al. term this situation a “behavioral trap” and describe the animal’s behavior as 
“disintegrated” and  “disconnected from its usual adaptive outcome” (Teitelbaum et al., 1990 
p. 101).  Such observations may strike a chord with researchers in adaptive behavior who 
have witnessed a behavior-based robot, trapped in the corner of a room, repetitiously 
alternating between left and right avoidance reactions. This suggests that the design of future 
robot architectures might benefit from understanding how similar problems are resolved in 
the vertebrate BG. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This article has reviewed the architecture and evolution of the vertebrate nervous system 
and drawn comparisons with the subsumption architecture (SA) proposed by Brooks' as a 
design methodology for building mobile robots. We have argued that an important dimension 
in the organization of the vertebrate brain is a division into multiple, vertical layers, and we 
have suggested, using the example of the rat defense system, that the subsumption 
architecture provides a useful metaphor for understanding many of the interactions between 
these layers.   
Vertebrate behavior is, however, determined by multiple inter-twined behavior systems 
that can be in conflict on several levels. We have argued that some of these conflicts cannot 
be easily resolved through fixed, subsumption-like links or through emergent switching 
processes.  In particular, we have suggested that conflicts that arise between functional units 
that are widely distributed in the brain may be resolved by centrally-located, specialized 
selection mechanisms in the basal ganglia. This suggestion could provide a way to reconcile 
the Jacksonian view of the brain as a layered control system with the idea of a centrencephalic 
dimension to brain organization. 
The notion of incremental evolution employed in the subsumption architecture was 
considered to capture some important characteristics of the evolution of the vertebrate 
nervous system; for example, that neural centers tend to retain much of their function as 
newer circuits evolve alongside, and that evolution often prefers to conserve and suppress 
redundant neural circuits rather than excise them. We also noted, however, the remarkable 
conservation of the basic vertebrate brain plan, which has survived adaptation and divergence 
to life in a wide range of adaptive zones. If the success of the vertebrate sub-phylum is in part 
due to this generic brain architecture, it seems likely that many of its characteristics could be 
usefully copied in the control systems of autonomous robots. 
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